The pathway out of neoliberalism and the analysis of political ideology in the post-crisis world by Wright, John S. F.
  
John Wright 
The pathway out of neoliberalism and the 
analysis of political ideology in the post-
crisis world 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Wright, John S. F. (2015) The pathway out of neoliberalism and the analysis of political ideology 
in the post-crisis world. Journal of Political Ideologies. pp. 109-133. ISSN 1356-9317 
DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2015.1034467 
 
© 2015 Taylor & Francis 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61354/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 1 
Abstract 
Neoliberalism has not simply ‘survived’; it has failed to die, seemingly outlived the socio-
economic conditions that gave rise to its existence.  In this way, the non-death of 
neoliberalism raises some important questions about the nature of ideology, principally: its 
relationship to socio-economic determinants; how it exercises its grip over subjects and how 
this grip, or hold, can itself be exorcised.  Seeking insights into these questions, this paper 
tells the story of the scholarly response to the non-death of neoliberalism over a ten year 
period of crisis: a pre-crisis era beginning with the Asian financial crisis (1997-2007) and a 
post-crisis era beginning with the global financial crisis to the present day (2008-2015).  The 
paper considers key scholarly responses to the persistence of neoliberalism at three 
fundamental levels: (a) the trajectory of their analytical technique, or the key concepts that 
underpin their wider project; (b) their critique of neoliberalism, or how these concepts render 
the construction of core neoliberal ideals; and, (c) their ideological response to neoliberalism, 
or their recommendations regarding the pathway out of neoliberalism.  On this basis, the 
paper engages in a discussion of the most plausible explanation for the non-death of 
neoliberalism and the most likely avenue along which the post-crisis world might build an 
escape. 
 
 
 
10570 words  
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The Pathway out of Neoliberalism and the Analysis of Political 
Ideology in the Post-Crisis World 
 
 
1. The Non-death of Neoliberalism  
Rocking pluralist notions of collectivism and the public interest, neoliberalism emerged in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s trumpeting its core notions of competitive markets and a limited 
state as the solution to the nagging problems of unemployment, inflation and the lack of 
economic growth.  In the decades that followed, neoliberalism reoriented key policy sectors in 
national economies across the North Atlantic and the Asia Pacific from health and education, 
to banking and finance, to trade and international relations.  In the first decade of the new 
millennium, however, a liquidity shortfall in the US mortgage market precipitated a crisis that 
only state intervention prevented from becoming a catastrophic melt-down of the entire global 
financial system.  At the height of the crisis, former agents of neoliberalism demanded 
decisive state intervention in the very governance regimes in which they had supplanted state 
authority, assumed self-regulatory functions and pressed consistently for still greater 
autonomy and market based freedoms.  As the crisis unfolded, states demonstrated the 
centrality of their capacities for redistributive politics and shaping social compromises to the 
smooth functioning of the global economy.  They seized control of troubled banks and 
investment houses.  They printed and spent vast sums of public money to provide stimulus to 
faltering national economies.  They bailed-out failing private enterprises, providing them with 
massive public subsidies.  They brought fluidity to frozen markets and returned key 
businesses to states of profitability.
1
 
2
 
3
  In the wake of the crisis, the role of decisive state 
action in restoring confidence to the global economy seemed to have thrown down the 
gauntlet to the neoliberal principles of competitive markets and a limited state.  Even Alan 
Greenspan, the former head of the US Federal Reserve, publically apologised for his 
ideological zeal in pursuing the development of unfettered markets.
4
  Popular concern for 
fundamental questions regarding the role of the state in the national economy also remerged.  
Citizen movements, like Occupy Wall Street, gave voice to the ideals of a growing ‘global 
justice movement’, which embraced notions of participatory democracy, universal rights, 
global solidarity and equality of access to resources and opportunities.
5
  By 2009, the world 
seemed to stand on the brink of a new era.  Where, in 1980, incoming US President Ronald 
Reagan had told the people of the United States that ‘government was the problem’; in 2009, 
newly elected President Barrack Obama told the Wall Street bankers that the only thing 
standing between them and the pitchforks was his administration.
6
   
 
And yet, today, neoliberalism seems more politically powerful than ever.  Somewhat 
counterintuitively, the practical policy solutions to a crisis that had its origins in the US 
financial sector were to socialise private losses, cut back government spending and reel in the 
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welfare state.
7
  In the years directly following the crisis, financial elites proved remarkably 
effective in defending the principles of competitive markets and a limited state, frustrating 
initiatives for reform.
8
  In both the UK and the US, competitive electoral politics produced 
dissatisfying efforts to re-regulate key sectors of the economy.
9
  And where technocrats and 
regulators remained convinced of “the need to produce an intellectually coherent account of 
regulation”; the resilience of the financial sector’s commitment to the pre-crisis imperatives of 
efficient markets and a minimal state has been striking.
10
  Even today, socialised private 
sector losses are still being managed under a pre-crisis narrative of preserving incentives for 
top executives, protecting the management of rescued institutions from politics and the state, 
and maximising shareholder value.
11
  While public outrage continues to simmer, all impetus 
for major policy change seems lost.  Despite a decade long succession of political, 
international and economic crises that began with the 1997 East-Asian financial crisis and 
concluded with the 2008 global financial crisis, each of which would seem to have outmoded 
its core conceptual notions that market competition and a limited state offer the best 
prospects for growth, innovation and employment, neoliberalism continues to flourish.  It is 
still here, stronger than ever, the predominant political ideology of the new millennium.     
 
How could this have possibly happened?  How could an ideology, which, at its core, is averse 
to all forms of government planning, which is hostile to notions of the public interest, which 
limits the role of the state to the protection of individual property rights, which ignores all 
social groups and collectives, which sees only rational self-interested consumers, which, in 
fact, holds that there is no such thing as society, and which ultimately seeks to implement a 
practical policy programme of tax-cuts, privatisation, market competition, de-regulation and 
competitive contracts and tendering, possibly have emerged as the solution to the greatest 
economic catastrophe since the crash of 1929?  In the academic literature, this, the curious 
case of the non-death of neoliberalism, is an issue of some importance.
12
  Indeed, 
neoliberalism has not simply ‘survived’; it has failed to die; and for many scholars, seems to 
have outlived the socio-economic conditions that gave rise to its existence.  Neoliberalism is 
not even really alive; it is un-dead, a zombie, risen from the grave, one that stalks the post-
crisis era with as much, if not more resolve, than its live incarnation menaced the pre-crisis 
era.  In this way, the non-death of neoliberalism, raises some fundamental questions about 
the nature of ideology, principally: its relationship to socio-economic determinants, how it 
exercises its grip over subjects and how this grip, or hold, can itself be exorcised.  Seeking 
insights into these issues, this paper tells the story of the scholarly response to the non-death 
of neoliberalism over a ten year period of crisis: a pre-crisis era beginning with the Asian 
financial crisis (1997-2007) and a post-crisis era beginning with the global financial crisis and 
concluding with the present day (2008-2015).  The paper considers key scholarly responses 
to the persistence, or non-death of neoliberalism, at three fundamental levels: (a) the 
trajectory of their analytical technique, or the key concepts that underpin their wider project; 
(b) their critique of neoliberalism, or how these concepts render the construction of core 
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neoliberal ideals; and, (c) their ideological response to neoliberal ideals, or their 
recommendations regarding a pathway out of neoliberalism.  On this basis, the paper 
engages in a discussion of the most plausible explanation for the non-death of neoliberalism 
and the most likely pathway along which the post-crisis world might fashion an escape.   
 
2. Scholarly Responses to Neoliberalism in the Pre-Crisis Era (1998-2007)  
In 1936, Keynes was sure that the power of vested interests was vastly exaggerated 
compared with the influence of ideas over politics.
13
  In those days, Keynes was referring to 
the predominance of laissez-faire liberalism, to which economists of his generation ascribed 
the great crash of 1929.  Following the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, however, Keynes’ 
views on the influence of ideas over politics chimed with the work of individuals and scholarly 
collectives who became interested in the predominance of a new form of liberalism over 
politics and economics, namely neoliberalism, which continued to rule supreme during the 
period 1997-2008, and seemingly in the absence of the same kind of informed and 
authoritative challenge that economists like Keynes once mounted against laissez-faire 
liberalism.  In response to the apparent neoliberal hegemony of the post-millennial world, 
these scholars set themselves the task of explaining how and why neoliberal ideology had 
obtained and retained its power in Europe and the United States, and what possible pathways 
out of neoliberalism remained open to the world.  Today, these responses are sufficiently 
settled and diverse to display unique, and indeed quite fundamental, characteristics that 
facilitate a systematic investigation.  In this section, the paper considers key responses to the 
neoliberal hegemony of the pre-crisis era (1997-2008), exploring their general characteristics 
and bringing them into proximity with each other at three elementary levels: (a) analytic, (b) 
critique, and (c) ideology. 
 
The decade long sequence of crises though which neoliberalism maintained its domination 
over politics and economics began with the East Asian financial crisis of 1997.  The Asian 
financial crisis was the product of a dramatic reversal of foreign capital flows that sent 
regional currencies plummeting, brought several key economies to the brink of default and 
shattered market confidence throughout the entire Asian region.  The precise cause of the 
crisis has been the subject of robust debate.  Some analysts attribute the massive capital 
outflows to fundamental economic weaknesses and policy making inadequacies across the 
region.  Others, however, argue that self-fulfilling expectations and financial panic were 
largely responsible for the depth and severity of the crisis.
14
  But, in general, analysts 
associate the collapse with insufficient regulatory oversight, or, the rapid decentralisation of 
the financial sector in the absence of adequate mechanisms for its supervision and 
regulation.
15
 
16
 
17
 For our purpose, however, the point is that scholarly doubt about 
neoliberalism’s influence as a doctrine, which pretended to rule and understand the global 
economy, was also among the major results of the crisis.  And, in the years following, 
Anthony Giddens, with his Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, was among the first 
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authoritative scholars to deliver a sustained and systematic response to the dubious levels of 
influence that neoliberalism had achieved over national and global policy making.
18
   
 
2a. The Liberal Epistemological Response 
In The Third Way, Giddens analysed political ideologies, principally old style social 
democracy and neoliberalism, by comparing them, or essentially, by attempting to understand 
them in relation to one another.  Herein, his analytical technique involved an epistemological 
and, more specifically, liberal approach to ideological analysis.  The Third Way assembled the 
ideologies of neoliberalism and classical social democracy, set them side-by-side and 
considered the terrain.  The work argued that social democracy was about collectivism, 
demand management, a mixed economy and pervasive state intervention.  By contrast, 
neoliberalism was about markets, individualism and a limited state.  Like a liberal of the 
Millian stripe, Giddens analysed each ideology as a fallible perspective, or truth claim.  Social 
democracy, he suggested, had failed to grasp the utility of markets in providing essential data 
for buyers and sellers.  It had underestimated the capacity of capitalism to innovate, to adapt 
and to generate higher levels of productivity.  By contrast neoliberalism had ignored the social 
basis of the market and had cast the communal foundations on which they depended to the 
winds.  At its core, The Third Way was about understanding ideology, about a process of 
liberal conciliation.  It assembled conflicting ideologies, extracted and catalogued their key 
ideals; and, it analysed them as fallible approximations of truth.  Gidden’s technique was 
about discussion, dialogue and elucidation, about teasing out a compromise, or a consensus, 
around a new, or third, set of ideals: essentially, the third way.   
 
Based on this liberal analytic, Giddens critique of neoliberalism evaluated the veracity of its 
core ideational content for its internal coherency, and ultimately attempted to dissolve the 
consensus that had built up around it.  Writing in 1998, only one year after the Asian financial 
crisis, Giddens argued that neoliberalism was already “in trouble”, highlighting serious internal 
tensions within the doctrine, suggesting that its two halves stood in marked contradiction.
19
  
Neoliberalism was about hostility to big government and the welfare state.  It was about 
enthusiasm for competitive markets, Thatcherism and globalisation.  However, Giddens 
thought these core ideals lacked consistency.  For Thatcherites, on the one hand, the 
conservative ideals of the traditional family and national identity circumscribed neoliberalism’s 
core notions of choice and individualism.  On the other hand, for neoliberals of a Randian ilk, 
the ideals of market competition, individualism and free trade trumped, and thereby fractured, 
all traditional notions of family and national citizenship through an outright denial of the social 
and political basis of the market.  The crux of Gidden’s critique was that neoliberalism 
fragmented as much as it unified; and that, therefore, states were necessary as a stabling 
force.
20
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Based on this critique, the work sought to build a new consensus around an alternate set of 
core ideals, ‘a third way’, which Giddens offered as ideology, a contribution to the debate 
about the future of social democratic politics.  As a term, the third way had “no particular 
significance in itself”.
21
  Indeed, the third way was simply a compromise position between 
older pluralist notions of collective politics and the public interest, and the contemporary 
neoliberal hegemony of competitive markets and a limited state.  As such, The Third Way 
made an ideological case for a revival of social democracy and the construction of a neo-
pluralist cosmopolitan state based on a five key dilemmas of the global age.  At heart, this 
ideological case for the renewal of social democracy was thoroughly liberal and 
epistemological; it was about the rational recognition of the need to solve key dilemmas of a 
new political age.  To some extent, The Third Way was a remarkably unambitious response to 
the neoliberal hegemony, it was a compromise, a conciliation, little more than a classic liberal 
exercise in facilitating public debate, gathering agreement and building consensus around a 
key set of practical political problems.   
 
Following close on the heels of the Asian financial crisis, a further series of economic, political 
and international catastrophes continued to shake at neoliberalism’s key notions of 
competitive markets and a limited state.  In March 2000, the burst of a speculative bubble in 
the information-technology sector, associated with the easy availability of venture capital, 
produced a bear market and a recession, which some analysts argue led to the extended 
period of low long-term interest rates that accompanied the growth of the bubble in the US 
housing market.
22
 
23
 
24
 In September 2001, acts of international terrorism raised a new 
appreciation for the ability of the state to provide security for citizens.  In the wake of the 
attacks, president George W. Bush beefed-up the American military and established the 
Department of Homeland Security, initiating the biggest expansion of the American state 
since the presidency of Lyndon Johnson.
25
  In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 
stunning magnitude of the US failure to bring stability to the country, which persists even to 
the time of writing, pointed to the consequences of dismantling the institutions of sovereignty 
and the necessity of the state for establishing a sustainable and legitimate peace .
26
  Even the 
build-up to the Iraq invasion seemed to demonstrate, however perversely, the power of the 
state to set and achieve policy goals both unilaterally and against the advice of international 
organisations and the sentiment of the wider global community.  In the face of these events, 
however, neoliberalism remained the common place of how many people understood and 
interpreted the world.
27
  In response, the scholarly critique of neoliberalism gained 
momentum.  In 2005, David Harvey published an influential account of the origins of 
neoliberalism and its proliferation on the world stage, A Brief History of Neoliberalism.  Like 
Giddens’ Third Way, Harvey’s A Brief History is well known.  For our purposes, however, the 
point worth emphasising is that the work develops a similarly epistemological analysis, but 
sets out both its critique of neoliberalism and its ideological programme along broadly Marxist 
lines.   
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2b. The Marxist Epistemological Response 
In A Brief History, Harvey analysed neoliberalism exclusively.  Unlike the more liberal 
Giddens, he did not assemble opposed ideologies, compare and contrast them, analyse them 
as fallible truth claims.  Instead, the work highlighted the divergences between neoliberal 
ideology and the practical policy making of neoliberal governments.  Nevertheless, the 
analytical technique of A Brief History remained thoroughly epistemological.  Harvey’s aim 
was to understand the hegemonic rise of the neoliberal state: establish its origins, track its 
development, identify its policy applications.  For Harvey, the basic analytical problem was 
that the neoliberal state was incoherent.  It didn’t make sense.  It was an “unstable and 
contradictory political form”.
28
  For example, in the U.S., Harvey observed that neoliberals, like 
Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, had advocated markets, competition and free trade; 
but that they had also introduced tariffs to support local industry and imposed quotas on 
foreign imports to protect domestic suppliers.  Further, Reagan and Bush had also presided 
over massive budget deficits and dramatic increases in government spending, particularly on 
defence and security.  Similarly, in the EU, neoliberal member states had advocated policies 
on free trade only to impose restrictions on agriculture.  With their US counterparts, they had 
preached programmes of de-regulation, but had in fact legislated to widen the regulatory 
domain.  In addition, EU states had also increased government spending, run large deficits 
and regularly intervened in the market for the purpose of gathering political support.  
Attempting to resolve these inconsistencies, A Brief History developed an eminently 
reasonable conclusion: neoliberal ideology was too demanding; even the most fundamental 
neoliberal state, it suggested, would experience difficultly adhering to the neoliberal policy 
agenda at all times.  And here, the problem was twofold: neoliberal ideology not only 
conflicted with the different state forms that had existed prior to the neoliberal turn; but 
external geographical features also complicated any attempt to construct a stable proto-
typical neoliberal state.
29
   
 
At the level of critique, however, A Brief History took an odd and decidedly Marxist turn.  
Given that the neoliberal state was an unstable political form that didn’t really make much 
sense; the work conjectured that the hegemony must exist for other than purely rational 
reasons.  And at this point, Harvey turned to the ready and familiar notion of Marxist class 
struggle.  For Harvey, the hegemony of the neoliberal state pointed to “the crucial role of class 
struggle in either checking or restoring elite class power”.
30
  And even more than that, the 
entire period from the late seventies to the new millennium amounted to “a whole generation 
of sophisticated strategizing on the part of ruling elites to restore or enhance overwhelming 
class power”, which neoliberal ideology had “effectively disguised”.
31
  In the new millennium, 
the subsequent turn to the neo-conservatism of the second Bush administration served as an 
indication of how far economic elites were prepared to go, and indeed the authoritarian 
strategies they were prepared to deploy, in order to sustain their power.
32
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Based on this Marxist critique, A Brief History developed an ideology of resistance and 
democratic struggle.  Unlike Giddens, Harvey was not about building consensus around a 
new set of core dilemmas and policy solutions.  A Brief History was about initiating a “political 
process that can lead us to point where feasible alternatives, real possibilities, become 
identifiable”.
33
  And significantly, A Brief History pointed out that Marxist notions of class, class 
struggle and resistance were realities of this process.  The world’s population, Harvey 
suggested, must either respond to neoliberalism in class based terms or resign itself to a 
historical and geographical trajectory defined by overwhelming upper class power.
34
  
Nevertheless, A Brief History did not “wax nostalgic” for the rediscovery of the old 
revolutionary proletarian class.  Rather, its ideology was about an agenda of popular mass 
politics and social democracy, about uniting global justice movements, regaining popular 
control of the state apparatus and deepening the democratic practices and values that 
underlay “the juggernaut of market power”.
35
  In this way, Harvey’s ideology was 
unambiguously Marxist.  And to some extent, it renders A Brief History an almost 
schizophrenic response to the post-millennial hegemony.  Having cast the neoliberal state as 
an unstable political form, the work seems to have abandoned, or become somehow unable, 
or even unwilling, to sustain the epistemological trajectory of its analysis, and to have 
reached, with no little gusto, for the convenient and familiar notions of the neoliberal state as 
mask for elite power, and for a practical political programme of resurgent mass social and 
political movements voicing popular demands for egalitarian politics, economic justice, fair 
trade and economic security.
36
     
 
That same year, however, A Brief History was joined by two important, and indeed very 
different, responses to the predominance of neoliberalism.  The first essentially consisted of a 
dialogue between two scholars, Michael Freeden and Manfred Steger, about the broader 
study of ideology.  In 2005, this dialogue was not really a response to the apparent neoliberal 
hegemony; however, it remains worthy of consideration given both its trajectory, and, the 
influence it would come to exercise over other scholars in the field following the crisis of 2008.  
The second response was a more collective, essentially functionalist, scholarly endeavour 
that developed a substantive hypothesis for a new world of regulatory capitalism.
37
   
 
2c. The Ideational Response 
In 2005, Manfred Steger challenged Michael Freeden’s sceptical assessment that it was too 
early to announce ‘globalism’ as an established ideology.
38
 
39
 The significance of this 
challenge was that it belay an emerging technique for the analysis of political ideology.  At its 
core, this technique was ideational, and involved the empirical study of ideas as real and 
existing concrete entities.  By implication, its critique of neoliberalism was morphological.  
However, in 2005, neither the analytic nor the critique constituted a response to the neoliberal 
hegemony of the post-millennial world.  Instead, these elements largely responded to 
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developments in the theory of language.  It was only after 2008 that Steger would fully 
elaborate and expand both Freeden’s analytic and critique to develop a direct ideological 
response to the neoliberal hegemony. 
 
For Michael Freeden, policy is the embodiment of ideology.  Indeed, Freeden holds that the 
core claims of an ideology essentially vie for implementation as public policy.  In this way, 
ideologies have an important political role as instruments for fashioning collective decisions.
40
  
And at this point, Freeden’s work is far from political science’s old hostility to political ideas as 
the expression of material self-interest.  For Steger too, ideologies enable political action.  
Further, they also bind people to circumscribed worldviews and constrain their activity.  Like 
Freeden’s, Steger’s analytical technique was ideational.  Ideology and its conceptual content 
are the raw materials, the empirical data, on which the analysis of political action depends.  
Under this technique, the analyst is concerned with utterances, speeches and writings of key 
stakeholders and influential advocates.
41
  Within the technique, the key issue is largely one of 
establishing the ideational boundaries of ideological systems.  Here, the technique involves 
the concept of morphologies.  Conventionally, ideological thinking has been linked to great 
ideological families, like liberalism and socialism, between and around which scholars have 
drawn sharp lines of difference, creating distinct and separate spheres of thought.  However, 
developments in the philosophy of language have shown that words and languages overlap, 
complement and delineate each other’s meanings.  Consequently, the ideational technique 
holds that conceptual meanings always reflect the adjacency of one concept to another.  In 
other words, a change in the meaning of one concept will affect the meanings of other 
concepts in the same relational network.
42
  For the ideationalist, the analytical task is about 
capturing and recording the changing morphologies of ideological systems.   
 
Based on this analytic, the ideational critique of neoliberalism is about redrawing or re-
categorising its conceptual boundaries, and the concomitant assertion that neoliberalism is 
about conceptual pluralities, not singularities.  Thus, and consistent with shifts in the theory of 
language, neoliberalism must also necessarily come in many permutations.  For example, 
although neoliberals may share a common belief in the power of self-regulating free markets 
and a limited state, the doctrine will necessarily involve different hues and multiple variations 
on these components, some of which will display significant differences.  And where any 
singular notion of neoliberalism—like the one presented in this essay—in terms of free-
markets and a limited state can possibly hold meaning; it is only as an ideal-typical composite 
that enables scholars in field to pursue their theoretical tasks more easily.  As such, the 
ideational critique of neoliberalism does not really respond to the neoliberal hegemony of the 
pre-crisis era; to a large extent it is about keeping pace with developments in the philosophy 
of language, about establishing, or tracking, a relational network of adjacent concepts, and 
core claims that play crucial semantic and political roles, through which the commitment to 
free-markets and a limited state derives meaning.  And for Steger, this particular network of 
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concepts did not even amount to something called ‘neoliberalism’, but to something else 
called ‘globalism’.
43
  Where Freeden had presented an ideational analytical technique for the 
purpose of providing insights and clarities, not for “definitively resolving the issues of which 
ideologies exist in the world of politics”;
44
 Steger had challenged and expanded Freeden’s 
analytic into an indirect, or nascent, critique of the neoliberal hegemony via the construction of 
a relational network of core and adjacent concepts called ‘globalism’, which, he argued, was 
both “the dominant ideology of our time” and the network of meaning “against which all 
challengers must define themselves”.
45
  However, in 2005, Steger’s nascent critique still 
lacked ideology, or a notion of the pathway out of the apparent ‘globalist’ hegemony.  But this 
would come only later, in 2012, with the identification of a worthy challenger network.
46
   
 
That same year, 2005, David Levi-Faur, Jacint Jordana and John Braithwaite advanced a 
thesis for regulatory capitalism, a term intended, like Steger’s globalism, as a replacement for 
other terms, like ‘the new world order’, ‘global capitalism’ or ‘the neoliberal hegemony’.
47
 
48
 
49
 
50
 But unlike the ideationalists, regulatory capitalism did not try to understand the ideological 
content, the intellectual origins, the policy applications, and certainly not the conceptual 
network through which neoliberal commitments derived their meaning.  Indeed, this new 
analytical technique had its origins in political science, was seemingly pragmatic, functional, 
to some extent even realist, or put simply, the very antithesis of Freeden’s ideational analytic, 
and almost, but not quite, a return to political sciences’ rationalisation of political ideology as 
unabashed self-interest.      
 
2d. The Functionalist Response 
From about the middle of the 1990s, scholars of regulatory governance had begun to write 
about the significant changes gripping the organization of governments and policy sectors in 
the United States, Europe and around the world. Collectively, these scholars produced a 
substantive body of work that reflected on the multiplicity of cross-national and cross-sectoral 
policymaking changes ushered in by neoliberal governments since the mid-1970s.  
Regulatory governance scholars were interested in the nature of these changes.  They were 
interested in why they had occurred, whether they were particular to individual countries or 
whether they witnessing a more fundamental change to the structure of western government 
and society itself.  Common to all their accounts of change was the observation that 
neoliberalism and its program of de-regulation and privatization was not matched with 
substantial deregulation at the practical level of policy making.  Rather, the Thatcher 
government and the Reagan administration had ushered in a substantive re-regulation of 
state, market, and society.  They had created freer-markets.  But they had also introduced 
many more rules in order to make them work.
51
 
52
 
 
On the basis of this peculiar observation, regulatory governance scholars began to develop a 
new analytical technique that applied within a global governance context.  This analytic 
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suggested that public ownership and centralized planning of national economies were being 
displaced by the construction of a new array of regulatory governance techniques and 
mechanisms as applied by a range of newly established independent regulatory agencies.
53
  
In the main, the new analytic was about recognizing and highlighting systemic differences and 
policy divergences between national policy sectors.  Equally, however, it also about 
emphasizing deeper processes of convergence, which related to the functional rather than 
territorial basis on which policy sectors were becoming increasingly organized.  Using this 
functional analytical technique, regulatory governance scholars argued that nation states had 
become rule takers as much as rule makers.  And in some sectors, they took more rules than 
in others.  For example, in policy sectors like banking, finance, shipping and air safety, the 
demand for regulation was inherently global and beyond the control of an individual nation 
state.
54
  Because, in today’s globalized world, functional rather than territorial considerations 
were more relevant to policy making across nearly all policy sectors .
55
  Accordingly, the 
analytical technique was about tracking the spread, or the contagious diffusion, of regulatory 
demands, instruments and governance techniques across global policy networks. 
 
The conceptual significance this functional analytic should not be understated.  In the first 
place, unlike Freeden and Steger’s ideational technique, which reflected recent shifts and 
developments in the philosophy of language, the functional analytic was a direct response to 
the apparent neoliberal hegemony of the 1980s and 1990s.  In the second place, it explicitly 
rejected the ideational construction of political action.  Under the functional analytic, 
ideologies have no political role.  They are neither instruments for fashioning collective 
decisions, nor rationales that enable political action.  Indeed, the functional analytic explicitly 
denies that ideologies like neoliberalism constrain activity and bind people to circumscribed 
worldviews.  Ultimately, the key observation of ‘freer markets, more rules’ expresses not 
simply a rejection of the core thesis of the ideational technique, but the inverse proposition: it 
was the rules that mattered, not the ideals.    
 
Nevertheless, the functional critique of neoliberalism was also removed from the old and well 
known hostility of political science to ideology as the rationalization of material self-interest.  
For regulatory governance scholars, the contagious diffusion of regulatory devices and 
instruments suggested that governance structures of late capitalist economies had under 
gone fundamental changes, in which regulatory solutions shaped in North America and 
Europe had been projected internationally.  In other words, ours was not a world of 
neoliberalism.  It was a new era of regulatory capitalism, under which political institutions and 
strategic nodes of governance, with their capacities for rule-making, were the primary source 
of power.  On this basis, the functionalist critique of neoliberalism involved a fundamental 
challenge to the wider neoliberal notion that power resided in free-markets, competition and a 
minimal state, and likewise an adjacent challenge to the Marxist proposition that power lay in 
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class struggle, class domination and wider economic processes.  By contrast, the functionalist 
critique held that, in a world of regulatory capitalism, power lay in the capacity for rule-making.  
 
Under this critique, the 1997 Asian financial crisis was the smoking gun, the proof that the 
apparent neoliberal hegemony was little more than a façade.  For functionalists, the crisis 
amounted to the last gasp of neoliberalism as a coherent ideology that pretended to rule the 
world.
56
  The critique held that while, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Chicago-led 
Washington Consensus had taken hold at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank and important states across Europe and the Asia Pacific Rim; it had not taken hold in 
Asia.  In the wake of the 1997 crisis, the economies that recovered most quickly were those, 
like South Korea and Malaysia, whose governments emphatically rejected the IMF’s 
neoliberal prescription for steering their economies out of crisis.  In the aftermath, the 
Washington Consensus collapsed under the realization that the economies of Asia were not 
exceptions to the neoliberal hegemony; but, in fact, half the world—and also the half that was 
performing best economically.  As the 1990s progressed, the functionalist critique ran that the 
Washington consensus began to break down in the UK and the US where “third-way” 
economists, like Joseph Stiglitz, and other key intellectual figures, such as Giddens himself, 
became influential in stemming the tide of market fundamentalism and reshaping the thinking 
of the Clinton administration and the Blair government around notions of good governance 
and the rule of law.
57
 
58
 
 
By 2005, however, the thesis for regulatory capitalism had not developed an explicitly 
ideological component, which, like Steger’s, would arrive only in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis.  For the present, regulatory governance scholars were content with their 
analytic and their critique, on the basis of which that they could confidently point out, and with 
no small element of justification, that those who thought we lived in an era of neoliberalism 
were, quite simply, mistaken.
59
 
 
3. Scholarly Responses to Neoliberalism in the Post-Crisis Era (2008- )  
In 2008, the decade long sequence of political, international and economic catastrophes that 
had begun with the Asian financial crisis culminated with a liquidity shortfall in the US banking 
system that contributed to the failure of key businesses, an equities rout across global stock 
markets and a major decline in world economic activity, or in other words, the 2008 global 
financial crisis— the most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression.  The 
immediate cause of the crisis was the growth of a housing bubble across the North Atlantic.  
From 1997 to 2007, both housing and commercial real estate soared in Europe and North 
America.  In the US, housing prices alone rose 175 percent.  In Spain, prices rose 180 
percent.  In the UK: 210 percent.  And in Ireland: 240 percent.
60
  Today, economists generally 
associate the steady inflation of the bubble with four factors: a prolonged period of low 
interest rates, ready inflows of foreign capital, the development of complex mortgage 
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securities in the financial sector and the popularity of government sponsored housing 
programs.  When the bubble burst, many assumed that neoliberalism would burst with it; or, 
at least, that neoliberal ideas had passed their peak and would likely survive as a critique of 
pluralist notions of collectivism and the public interest.
61
   
 
But neoliberalism defied such predictions.  Practical policy solutions to the crisis amounted to 
a socialization of private losses, the public bailout and subsidization of banks and financial 
houses, cuts to government spending on social services and a more general reeling-in of the 
welfare state, in other words, initiatives consistent with the pre-crisis neoliberal narrative of 
competitive markets and a limited state.  Despite a decade long sequence of economic, 
international and political catastrophes, each of which seemed to have outmoded much of its 
ideational content, neoliberalism had survived.  After 2008, the curious persistence, or non-
death, of neoliberalism provoked the interest of an even wider range of scholars and scholarly 
collectives.
62
 
63
 Post 2008, a new psychoanalytic response emerged, and existing ideational 
and functionalist responses became much more sophisticated, with each gaining an explicit 
ideological component.  Beyond 2008, the ideational and liberal responses would become the 
most persuasive, influencing the thinking of a variety of scholars from other fields, who 
embarked on a number of projects that sought to explain the seemingly unshakeable hold of 
the neoliberal hegemony on the post-crisis era.   
 
3a. The Psychoanalytic Response 
The psychoanalytic response to the persistence of neoliberalism was not homogenous, and 
involved the contributions of several different scholars working at various analytical, critical 
and ideological levels, which both extended and, to some extent, even abrogated each other.  
While a joint discussion of the levels at which these varied responses were formulated 
facilitates the completion of the task at hand, it should also be stressed that there are 
significant nuances and grounds for disagreement at each level, and that the use of the term 
‘the psychoanalytic response’ is wholly artificial, and has been adopted only in the interest of 
seeing off the task.   
 
At the level of analytical technique, the psychoanalytic response involves two key positions.  
Under the first, ideology is a non-rational process of rationalising human society.  Under the 
second, ideology is an imposter for the lack of a social essence.  The first analytical, and 
essentially non-rational, technique has its origins in the work of Michael Rosen.
64
  For Rosen, 
human beings are gripped by a psychological need to make the world in which they live more 
acceptable to themselves.  And in this way, human societies are systems that maintain 
themselves through non-rational means.  For example, Rosen held that unequal societies, in 
particular, were not simply preserved by the material forces of coercion, such as the police 
and the army, but also by a kind of ‘false consciousness’ or ‘non-rational rationalising’ on the 
part of ordinary citizens, who, in any other case, would have genuine material interests in 
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bringing change to that society.
65
  Under this analytic, Rosen was indebted to Nietzsche, who 
had argued that human beings carry off their non-rational rationalisation of society either by 
Dionysian intoxication and abandonment, or by Apollonian imagining of an ideal realm, based 
on the notion that there is a reason for everything, even suffering.  Unlike Nietzsche, however, 
Rosen’s analytic was less artistic and much more scholarly: it was about uncovering how, in 
historically specific cases, “certain models of intelligibility and models of the nature of reality 
come to exercise a hold over particular societies at particular times by meeting the need for 
explanation in certain ways”.
66
   
 
At the level of analytic, the second key technique within the psychoanalytic response was 
much more radical and imaginative, and pushed these same Nietzschean sentiments into 
somewhat cynical terrain.  For Slavoj Zizek, ideology was neither a Dionysian numbing of the 
senses, nor an idealised Apollonian dream world created to escape a traumatic social reality.  
Rather, it was a necessary illusion, the purpose of which was to structure both individual 
human subjectivities, and indeed the social and political relationships that make human 
societies possible.  For Zizek, human society lacks an essence, or a non-material adhesive, 
capable of binding societies and individual people together.  Ideology, he argued, was the 
imposter for this lack.  It was a placebo-like adhesive that pretends to glue society together, 
that offers a structure through which human subjectivities can develop, and along which 
human relationships and wider society can both exist and proceed.  And more than this even, 
Zizek’s analytic also involved an amusingly cynical component.  Subjects, he insisted, were 
aware of the imposter.  They understood that ideology was a sham, a placebo.  Yet, they 
would insist upon it.  Because social subjectivities needed ideology.  And they needed it not 
because they needed a non-rational rationalisation of their world, but because traumatic 
events such as natural disasters, human catastrophes, or, in other words, shocking, 
unexpected and unrecognisable events, or in other words again, ‘the Lacanian real’, 
necessarily permeated their everyday lives.  In this way, the real threatens to rupture society, 
to tear apart both individual subjectivities and social relationships.  The role of ideology is to 
bring meaning to these ruptures, to restore normality by instructing individuals on how to 
proceed in the face of the traumatic real.  For Zizek, ideology is the antidote for the real.  It 
sutures overs unexpected events, crises and catastrophes, which would otherwise make 
social and political life impossible.
67
 
68
 At this end of the psychoanalytic technique, ideology is 
much more than a non-rational rationalisation of society, it is a necessary condition both for 
the perception of a social reality, and also, for the very fostering of the human subjectivities 
that are even capable of engaging in a shared social and political life. 
 
Within this very broad analytic terrain, the psychoanalytic response developed manifold 
critiques of the resurgence of neoliberalism in the post-crisis era.  Some leaned on the 
analytic of non-rational rationalisation, emphasising the need for long-held common sense 
reactions to the problematic events of a crisis-wracked world.  For example, Andrew Gamble 
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argued that, in the UK, neoliberalism successfully appealed to classic British notions of 
balanced budgets and reduced spending, which had been widely regarded as the antidote to 
fiscal instability since the end of the Napoleonic Wars.
69
  In the US, neoliberalism appealed to 
the principles of fiscal conservatism and a limited state, which had steered the country out of 
the economic slump of the early 1970s.  Thus, the persistence of neoliberalism simply 
reflected the widespread apprehension among citizens that something needed to be done 
about debts and deficits.  Consequently, familiar neoliberal ideals supplied the everyday 
common sense that dominated popular discourses about post crisis economic policy.  And to 
some extent, government was also rather innocently involved, simply reapplying familiar 
neoliberal ideals in the hope that growth would return in the future as it always had in the 
past.  Thus, the critique held that neoliberalism’s resilience was about the profound earlier 
successes it had enjoyed as a popular and political discourse of economic common sense.
70
   
 
Others, however, developed their critique along the more radical analytic lines of ideology as 
imposter.  For example, Jason Glynos sketched out the persistence of neoliberalism in terms 
of a restorative ‘cooling out’ process, under which the citizens of the north Atlantic became 
‘marks’, who were ‘taken-in’ and ‘blown-off’ by unscrupulous neoliberal agents.
71
 
72
 Under this 
elaborate critique, neoliberal discourse sutured over the privations of the crisis, the 
catastrophic real, and worked to re-affirm the norms of the pre-crisis financial regime.  In the 
pre-crisis boom, Glynos argued that UK citizens, or ‘the marks’, placed their trust, actively or 
tacitly, in the financial system, which had facilitated a dramatic rise in asset prices through low 
interest rates and easy access to credit.
73
  Those citizens who took out loans and bought 
assets were ‘taken in’.  And with the coming of the crisis in 2008, the practices and 
manoeuvres, under which ailing financial houses were bailed out and losses were socialised, 
amounted to a ‘blowing-off’ phase, in which the marks unwittingly found themselves the 
lenders of last resort left to ‘pick-up the tab’ for bankers and financial houses who had 
become ‘too big to fail’.  In the ‘big blow off’, the marks suffered wage freezes, job losses, 
benefit cuts, reduced public services and the erosion of their savings through lower interest 
rates for several years to come.  These sufferings produced a ‘squawking phase’, or a round 
of banker-bashing, in which public outrage found expression in movements like Occupy 
London, media focus on the wealthy one percent, the fat cats, and wider calls for a 
substantive transformation of the political and economic order.  Nevertheless, the marks were 
successfully ‘cooled out’ during a final phase in which a series expert reports and government 
White Papers reasserted the norms of the neoliberal finance regime.  These reports hailed 
the benefits of the old regime and recommended piecemeal reform.  They manufactured a 
narrative of shareholder democracy, bolstered by the establishment of concrete institutions, 
like UK Financial Investments Limited, which combined to suggest that the bubble would 
return, and the marks would one day get their money back.
74
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From this end of the psychoanalytical response, neoliberalism, at the level of critique, is about 
the perverse application of restorative language by which the 2008 crisis was constructed as 
a ‘freak accident’ grounded in personal and moral culpability.  At the level of ideology, 
however, this end of the response also cultivated notions of fantasy, which seem to resonate, 
even if only slightly, with Rosen’s analytic regarding the non-rational rationalisation of society.  
Post 2008, the application of this restorative language had enabled both the condemnation of 
the recklessness of the pre-crisis era and the marginalisation of alternative ideologies via the 
reaffirmation of the basis of the old neoliberal finance regime under the logics of austerity, 
prudent banking and shareholder citizenship.  But the irrational fantasies of North Atlantic 
citizens had also played a critical role.  Gripped by the resilient dream of ‘no more bust, only 
boom’, citizens of the North Atlantic ‘wanted their bubble back’.  And so they readily 
succumbed to the restorative logic and were prepared to insist upon neoliberal ideology even 
in the face of further disaster.  As a result, the perspective developed an ideology of social 
awareness, rationalising the operation of fantasmic logics and developing of collective 
capacity to counter their restorative force.  Escaping neoliberalism was about discovering a 
language capable of making sense of the current state of affairs, of outlining a range of 
solutions beyond neoliberalism, and of addressing problems in a manner that “minimises and, 
and hopefully removes, the risk of a repeat of the GFC [global financial crisis]”.
75
 
 
However, other psychoanalytic respondents cultivated a significantly more radical and 
redemptive, rather than rationalising and therapeutic, ideology.  Zizek, for example, argued 
that escaping neoliberalism was about mobilising the Lacanian notion of ‘the act’, nurturing a 
redemptive political moment, taking a leap of political and economic faith.
76
 
77
 Under this 
radical and redemptive ideology, escaping neoliberalism involved radical action and risk 
taking, “a step into the open with no guarantee of the final outcome”.
78
  The purpose of the 
redemptive act was to change the coordinates of the political situation of the post-crisis world, 
to interrupt “the present predominant movement”.
79
  At this radical level, liberal 
epistemological notions of social democracy, which attempted to counteract the system’s 
excesses, were merely expressions of the limits of common sense, and, for this reason, were 
doomed to failure.
80
  Provocatively, Zizek argued that the potentialities for a truly redemptive 
political moment would always be lost under any Giddens-like agenda of building consensus 
around counteractive ideals .
81
  For Zizek, the horizon of common sense could not provide the 
answers, and “one must risk the leap of faith”.
82
   
 
In terms of specifics, such a leap would involve, for example, not necessarily violence, but 
some form of mass collective action sufficient to disrupt the core principles of global 
capitalism followed by the “proper revolutionary work”’ of transforming the society that gave 
birth to global capitalism.
83
  In this way, the revolution, or the leap, is ongoing.  It must be 
repeated, again and again, and always in the face of disintegrating popular unity, until a true 
unity, grounded in the universalisms of democracy and social justice can emerge, freed from 
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the illusory universalism which gave impetus to the initial revolutionary moment.  However, 
Zizek also chided that such redemptive leaps of faith, or genuinely revolutionary moments, 
were indeed rare, and that “no teleology guarantees them”.
84
  Their success is entirely 
dependent on the emergence of skilled political agents, revolutionary masters, with the 
capacity to seize, understand and shape a contingent and unpredictable opening.
85
  Thus, at 
the level of ideology, Zizek’s position on the pathway out of neo-liberalism, or global 
capitalism as it may be, is really quite simple, and surprisingly unimaginative.  It’s about 
learning lessons from the past, about making observations in relation to the failed courses of 
past revolutions, attempting to set them right in the future with talk of fashioning a new, non-
illusory, post-revolutionary collective unity based on the principles of social justice and 
democracy.
86
   
 
3b.  Ideational and Functionalist Ideology 
After 2008, both the ideational thesis for globalism and the functionalist thesis for regulatory 
capitalism gained important ideological components.  In 2008, Braithwaite asserted that the 
new era regulatory capitalism was not even really a hypothesis, and more “a fact of how 
capitalism has evolved.”  It was a global order from which there was “no opt out”; and that, left 
ungoverned, would afflict our world “with unspeakable misery”.
87
  At the analytical level, Levi-
Faur and Jordana had already argued that the capacity for ruling making, monitoring and 
enforcement, or regulation, had become the major source of power in the twenty-first century, 
a fact that contested both Marxist and neoliberal constructions of power at the fundamental 
level.  After 2008, Braithwaite tracked the unfolding of this new regulatory order through the 
eighteenth-century police economy, the laissez-faire economy of the nineteenth century, the 
state provider economy of the mid twentieth century up to the arrival of twenty-first century 
hegemony of regulatory capitalism, delivering an account of the economic, political, and social 
evolution of capitalism both before and after the industrial revolution.
88
  Braithwaite argued 
that the unprecedented contemporary demand for regulation had emerged from the 
development of international communications technology, the growth of global mega-
corporations, the spread of American business culture following the close of the Second 
World War, and the projection of regulatory solutions developed in the North Atlantic across 
policy sectors around the globe.   
 
At the level of ideology, the pathway out of neoliberalism was about a sort of functional 
republicanism, about using the institutional architecture of liberal democratic states, and other 
strategic nodes of governance, to expand positive liberty and prevent the contraction of 
human freedom with the construction of regulatory governance arrangements that checked 
and balanced both state and corporate dominations.
89
  For example, 1997 Asian financial 
crisis had not necessarily undermined the case for the liberalization of the financial sector.  
Rather, it provided strong support for proceeding more slowly in order to ensure that the 
requisite regulatory institutions were in place.  Similarly, the 2008-9 financial crisis did not 
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undermine the case for innovation and development in the North Atlantic financial sector.  It 
too provided strong support for matching financial innovation and development with improved 
mechanisms, institutions and techniques for the regulation and governance of the sector.  
Thus, the crises of 1997 and 2008 offered an important insight: the existence of a reciprocal 
relationship between liberalisation and innovation within a policy sector and the requirement 
for regulatory institutions and governance frameworks to ensure their effective function.  Put 
in practical terms, innovative banking houses, like Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, 
actually stood in need of the very regulatory requirements on capital reserve holdings that 
their peculiar niche within sector had allowed them to avoid.  Similarly, the purchasers of 
exotic securities, the agencies rating their quality and the companies issuing the shares, all 
required processes for managing the mortgage backed securities and collateralised debt 
obligations, the very innovative nature of which had also allowed them to avoid (Braithwaite 
2010).
90
  For regulatory capitalism, the pathway out of neoliberalism was about recognising 
these ironies and attempting to forge regulatory solutions based on the existence of a 
reciprocal relationship between regulation and corporatisation.
91
  At this level, regulatory 
capitalism was far from the old political science notion of ideology as the rationalisation of 
material self-interest.  Indeed, ideology now had a role to play.  Braithwaite argued that old 
style social democratic politics remained as relevant today as it had been in the past; and that 
the architecture of the liberal democratic state, and other strategic nodes of influence, were 
open to manipulation by a wide range of interests, including neoliberal ones.  But the point 
was that the pathway out of neoliberalism was not about engaging in class politics, 
rationalising fantasmic logics, cultivating a redemptive political moment, or even building a 
liberal consensus around some alternative ideal.  Because the new era of regulatory 
capitalism was not something that the world could decide not to have.
92
  It was already here.  
And the pathway out of neoliberalism was about understanding how it worked, and trying to 
make it work with a little bit more justice, liberty, equality and fairness. 
 
By contrast, the ideological component of the ideational critique of neoliberalism was 
grounded in Freeden’s morphological analytic.  As an ideationalist, Freeden’s focus was on 
the usage of words and concepts in delivering political outcomes: in effect, the antithesis of 
the functionalist response.  For Freeden, ideology was a political act.  It converted a pool of 
virtually unlimited meanings into a monolithic certainty of de-contested ideals necessary for 
undertaking political action.
93
  Given that ideologies were not closed off from one another, the 
technique was also morphological.  Ideologies, like liberalism and conservatism, crashed and 
bounced off each other, morphing and redefining themselves over the field of political activity 
for the purpose of binding people to a particular course of action.
94
  This morphological, 
technique shared elements of its wider approach with the Cambridge school of political 
thought which, in the 1970s and 80s, had involved a similar analytic of ideology as the study 
de-contested meaning through which historical societies constituted their political culture. 
95
 
However, where the technique of Cambridge historians, like Skinner, Dunn and Pocock, 
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involved the detailed unpacking of what historical figures might have meant by the use of a 
specific word or concept, how their work related to the conventions, contexts and issues of 
their time and place; the morphological approach was sensitive to the production and 
consumption of both intentional and unintentional meanings, how these morphed and 
transformed a wider conceptual network.  In 2005, Steger had adopted and elaborated 
Freeden’s technique to sketch the outlines of an ideological network, or movement, called 
globalism.  And it was in 2012, when Steger and Wilson sketched the outlines of a contending 
network, ‘justice globalism’, that the ideational analytic developed an ideological component, 
or in other words, started to make prescriptions about possible pathways out of neoliberalism, 
and thus became a direct response to the neoliberal hegemony of the post-crisis world.
96
     
 
Focusing on the usage of words and concepts in delivering political outcomes, Steger and 
Wilson collected data from global civil society organisations, establishing the network of 
political ideas with which they constituted their political culture, marking it as ‘justice 
globalism’.  For Steger and Wilson, justice globalism was a coherent and maturing political 
alter-ideology of global significance, the antagonist to their earlier notion of globalism.
97
  And it 
was only through this construction of both a protagonist and an antagonist network of 
concepts that the ideational response was able to develop an ideological component.  In this 
way, for ideationalists, the pathway out of neoliberalism became about offering the global 
justice movement suggestions on how it might move forward against its opponent.
98
  And 
along these lines, Steger and colleagues advised, more than a little strangely, that justice 
globalism needed to capture and maintain the imagination of the masses by developing a 
coordinated political agenda.
99
  And here, the ideational response seemed to come full circle, 
concluding that justice globalism needed to become less about “the meta-politics of values 
and ideology” and more about “a political movement seeking to capture political power”.
100
  In 
other words, it was the agenda that mattered.  Almost counterintuitively, the key message of 
the ideational response to the neoliberal hegemony now pointed to justice globalism’s need to 
develop some sort of a concrete political agenda—whatever that agenda might be.  
 
4. Discussion 
To date, key scholarly responses to the non-death of neoliberalism haven taken Marxist, 
liberal, functionalist, ideational and psychoanalytical forms, which, at the levels of analytic, 
critique and ideology, display rather striking differences.  In developing a plausible 
explanation for the persistence of neoliberalism, and forging a pathway out, perhaps the 
liberal and the ideational responses have been the most influential.  For example, in 2009, 
Dryzek and Dunleavy directly argued that neo-pluralist ideology, namely, a Giddens-like 
revival of social democracy, offered the most profitable direction for future theorising on the 
role of the state and the market.
101
  Alternatively, in 2014, Siems and Schnyder presented an 
essentially liberal, or Gidden’s-like, flirtation, not with a revival of social democracy, but 
instead with the more antiquated early 20
th
 Century school of ordoliberalism as an additional 
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means by which the public sphere might develop some new policy tools, deflate bubbles, 
deliver transparency, link risks with responsibilities, and thereby escape neoliberalism’s grip 
over the agenda.
102
   
 
By contrast, in 2013, Schmidt and Thatcher offered a morphological analysis of neoliberalism, 
attempting to disentangle it from other forms of liberalism, noting how it had reversed the key 
principle of classic laissez faire liberalism, that political liberty ensures free markets, with the 
notion that economic freedom was a precondition of political freedom.
103
  Other contributors to 
the same volume likewise suggested that the persistence of neoliberalism was about the 
mutability of its ideals, its capacity to graft new ideas onto older ones and to use old ideas in 
new ways.
104
  It was about the advantages that neoliberal ideals held in policy debates 
compared with rivals, about how they made increasing competition and reducing barriers a 
priority across all policy sectors, thereby crowding out competing ideals.
105
 
106
 Escaping 
neoliberalism was about envisaging a situation in which breakdowns and internal 
contradictions stretched neoliberalism beyond breaking point;
107
 one in which key ideals might 
mix, hybridize and morph with statist or social democratic ideology.
108
  Equally, gaps between 
rhetoric and reality might widen to such an extent that neoliberalism would become irrelevant 
to policy debates.
109
  Possibly, rival ideas might gather consensus: neoliberalism might give 
way to a Giddens-like revival of social democracy, under which narratives of austerity and 
deficit reduction would yield to notions of community and collective responsibility, and to 
stakeholder as opposed to shareholder models of governance.
110
   
 
Arguably, however, the significant influence of the liberal and idealist responses is also a 
problematic feature of the debate.  With regard to the liberal response, the problems are 
relatively minor.  As previously noted, for example, Gidden’s The Third Way was a remarkably 
unambitious work insofar as it aimed to build a liberal consensus around key policy dilemmas 
of the contemporary age.  However, the great strength of The Third Way was that these 
dilemmas amounted a practical political agenda, elements of which the Blair Government in 
the UK and the Clinton Administration in the United States were actually able to implement.  
Indeed, even the functionalists remarked on the success of the third way in stemming the tide 
of neoliberalism in the 1990s.  And so where the liberal epistemological response produces a 
practical political agenda, it seems to have useful applications in building a pathway out of 
neoliberalism.  But the problems with the liberal epistemological framework lie largely in 
regard to the scholarly uses to which it has since been put.  And indeed, where liberal 
responses retreat from building consensus around practical policy dilemmas to building 
consensus around ideals, both abstracted and antiquated, like neo-pluralism and ordo-
liberalism, lack of ambition meets lack of an agenda.   
 
With regard to the ideational response, the problems are much more serious.  The ideational 
response to neoliberalism has its origins in the work of Michael Freeden and shares 
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conceptual commonalities with the Cambridge School’s approach to the study of the history of 
political ideas.  Freeden’s work primarily responds to developments in the theory of language.  
And in turn, the work of the Cambridge School also responded to the old political science 
notion of the history of ideas as a history of the rationalisation of material self-interest.  In this 
way, the ideational analytical technique was never intended as a practical and predictive 
instrument, let alone a device for sketching a pathway out of neoliberalism.  Both schools are 
largely about taking ideas seriously.  And indeed, when their analytical techniques are used to 
alternate ends, the ideational response largely implodes upon itself, either advising, 
somewhat banally, that the neoliberal hegemony will pass when its ideals stretch to breaking 
point, or recommending, somewhat counterintuitively, that social movements need to develop 
a concrete political agenda.  More generally, this implosion at the ideological level also raises 
additional questions about the nature of ideology and the broader strategic purposes of 
ideational analytic itself.  For example, ideationalists assert that ideology is a political act, that 
it circumscribes and enables political actions.  However, both functionalist and Marxist 
observations regarding ‘freer markets, more rules’ on the one hand, and ‘unstable and 
contradictory neo-liberal governments’ on the other, would seem to suggest that such 
assertions are largely unsustainable.  Further, if ideals exist as real things, even if we take 
them seriously, study them empirically, then what is the relationship between these concrete 
ideals and political actions; to what extent can ideals be abstracted from actions and still be 
considered to hold meaning; and more importantly, to what extent can ideals be abstracted 
from actions and still hold their utility across the wider social sciences?  For ideationalists, 
developing a plausible response to the neoliberal hegemony, and forging a pathway out, 
relies heavily upon developing answers to these questions.   
 
With regard to the less influential responses, such as the more rationalising elements of the 
psychoanalytic school, they too experience problems similar to those of the ideationalists, 
namely: the lack of a political agenda.  At the ideological level, these rationalising responses 
are similarly banal, pointing to the need to build social awareness, the requirement to develop 
a collective capacity for dissolving the influence of restorative fantasmic logics.  In practice, 
this, as they themselves suggest, does not amount to much more than helping citizens make 
sense of current affairs, outlining a range of solutions beyond neoliberalism, and addressing 
problems in such a way that minimises risk and removes the potential for a repeat of the 2008 
crisis. 
 
At the more radical end, however, the lack of a psychoanalytic influence on scholarly 
responses to neoliberalism is, to some extent, a major relief.  The notion of cultivating a 
redemptive political moment that rights the course of past revolutions, and which, by its own 
admission, has little guarantee of success, is not only simplistic and unimaginative; but is at 
best irresponsible, and, at worst, absurd.  A redemptive leap of faith is, not necessarily, but 
indeed potentially, about violent events of which the outcomes are uncertain and which 
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explicitly aim at destabilising the institutions of sovereignty.  While radical psychoanalytic 
thinkers may apply their ‘leap of faith’ within a frame that emphasises ongoing revolutionary 
work and universalisms like social justice and democracy, such a frame may well have 
alternative maifestations, like the 2003 invasion of Iraq, like the 2011 air-campaign in Libya, 
‘redemptive’ events that arguably involved neo-conservative assumptions about the end of 
history and the movement of all peoples towards the universals of liberty and capitalist 
enlightenment, rather than preferred universalisms of democracy and social justice.  At the 
least ‘irresponsible’, the early history of the twenty-first century would seem to serve as a dire 
warning to radical psychoanalysts about dangerous uncertainties involved in risking leaps of 
faith and cultivating redemptive political moments.    
 
But, thinking more generally, perhaps the strength of both the ideational and psychoanalytic 
responses is the emphasis they seem to place, however unrefined it may be, on the need to 
develop both a practical agenda and a deep understanding of the workings of global 
capitalism.  Indeed, if outlining a range of solutions beyond neoliberalism involves 
understanding the current state of affairs; and, if developing a political agenda implies the 
need to understand both the problems of capitalism and the means for their redress; then 
both the ideational and the psychoanalytic responses would seem to emphasise the value of 
precisely the kind of understanding of the workings of global capitalism that the functionalist 
response sets itself to provide.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect about the scholarly response to the non-death of 
neoliberalism is the lack of influence that the functionalist perspective has exercised.  If 
escaping neoliberalism is about understanding problems, discovering alternative languages 
and developing concrete agendas, then, arguably, the thesis for regulatory capitalism 
supplies these understandings.  Bureaucratic expansion via specialized regulatory agencies 
expresses a major developmental trend in government, through which regulatory states and 
other strategic nodes have become key players and facilitators within a new system of 
capitalist governance.
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 As a result, rule-making, rule-monitoring and rule-
enforcement, in short ‘regulation’, becomes a constitutive and mutually supportive element of 
capitalism, rather than a neoliberal antagonism, which opens up new avenues along which 
notions of liberty, fairness, legitimacy and equity can influence political, social and economic 
outcomes across a wide range of policy sectors.  But the point is: it’s the rules that matter.  
And consequently, the pathway out of neoliberalism would seem to be about using the 
architecture of the liberal democratic state, and other relevant strategic nodes of governance, 
to engage in regulation for the purpose of advancing classic republican notions of fairness, 
equality and positive liberty, or indeed, any other ideology.  At this point, the functionalist 
thesis for regulatory capitalism is far from the old political science notion of ideology as the 
mere expression of material self-interest.  Instead, regulatory capitalism suggests that political 
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concepts and political actions are, today, inextricably associated in the practice of rule-
making, and that while the old emphasis of political science on actions over ideals may well 
have risked the wider trajectory of the political agenda; the contemporary emphasis of 
ideationalists on concepts over actions risks the utility of ideological analysis to the wider 
social sciences.   
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